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A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY FOR ROMAN
CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS
Thomas L. Shaffer* & Robert E. Rodes, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Catholic universities in America go through periodic exertions to
define themselves and state their institutional goals. We had a col-
league fresh from a career at a British university during one of these
episodes; he reviewed the current draft memorandum on the Catholic
character of Notre Dame, with the current sense of urgency to define
our goals, and he said, "A university doesn't have goals. It doesn't de-
fine itself. It just is." He no doubt felt the same way about the law
school.
We would not be here to talk about a Christian theology for Ro-
man Catholic law schools if we agreed with our colleague. But, still,
what he said is common sense. It gives us a place to begin. The first
thing in a theology for law schools is that we have them; for present
purposes, we have them at universities that claim an identity within
and as the Roman Catholic Church. Your university maintains one
such law school; ours maintains another. The question in both instances
is: Why? Or, if you like: Why bother? The question was no doubt im-
portant to Father Vincent R. Vasey, who contributed richly to both of
our law schools, and in whose memory we come among you to talk
about it.'
One answer is that we maintain law schools at our universities for
the reason Mr. Iacocca maintains automobile factories: He makes
money by making cars. We make money by making lawyers. We well-
paid law teachers make money for ourselves and our families, and ours
and most Catholic universities operate their law schools at a net institu-
tional profit. In terms of the income statement, law schools at church-
affiliated universities serve the same function as the book store and, at
* B.A., J.D., LL.D.; Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame;
member of the Indiana Bar.
** A.B., J.D.; Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; member of the Massachusetts
and Indiana Bars.
1. Rev. Vincent R. Vasey, S.M., was a graduate of the Notre Dame Law School (J.D.,
1977) and a member of the law faculty at the University of Dayton. He was a scholar and teacher
of theology and of history, as well as of the law. Father Vasey's biography of the founder of the
Society of Mary, CHAMINADE: ANOTHER PORTRAIT (1987), was completed shortly before Vasey's
death in 1985. The interdisciplinary symposium--of which this lecture was a part in 1989-was
established in his memory.
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our university, the football program.
But if profit is the reason for Catholic law schools, the faculties of
the law schools are not honest. We do not say that our law schools exist
to contribute to the cost of undergraduate university education; we say
that our law schools exist to provide legal education to people who pro-
pose to become lawyers. Once profit is discounted, or at least set aside,
the answer to the question of why our Roman Catholic universities
maintain law schools should be theological. The Roman Catholic
Church should not be providing education of any sort unless its doing
so has a theological purpose. The theological answer need not exclude
the many Jews and Protestants and other non-Catholics who work at
our universities and who care about them. We think the theological
discussion can be carried on in a way that will interest non-Catholics.
We suspect it cannot be carried on well without the participation of
Jews and non-Catholic Christians. Their participation will not keep the
answer from being theological; nor will it keep the theological answer
from being Catholic theology.
II. WHY A ROMAN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY MAINTAINS A LAW
SCHOOL
We suggest that there are five steps in a theological answer to the
question of why a Roman Catholic university maintains a law school.
First, the law school is the presence of the church. The church is
present in the law school, and the law school is present in the church. It
is present as the church.
Second, this is a radical presence of service and not of power. To
be present and to be subordinated to service in the world-to be as
Jesus said, a servant rather than a benefactor-is radical. It goes to the
root of our tradition, which is the good news of the coming of the
Kingdom.
Third, it is a presence in the world. The law school is present in
the world. It is present because of the world.
Fourth, this is a presence enacted vicariously. We who both ponder
and preserve a theology for law schools do not go into the world to be
present there as the church; our students do that. Our presence as edu-
cators is a presence involved in the world because it is involved in the
lives of those who are being formed to go into the world.
Fifth, ours is then a presence that reaches into the world in order




A. The Presence of the Law School Is the Presence of the Church
(Shaffer)2
Our Roman Catholic universities maintain facilities to educate
people to be lawyers, because legal education is a way for the church to
be in the world. This may not sound earth-shattering at first, but when
applied to a Catholic law school in the United States-ours, yours, or
anybody's-this is a radical thing to say. The evident mission of Catho-
lic legal education in the United States, since the enterprise started
after the Civil War, has been to get power to the children and
grandchildren of the late immigrants. To get power for our own by
getting them onto the ladder of American vertical mobility, into posi-
tions of political influence, into judgeships, into partnerships in big law
firms, on law faculties other than those at Catholic universities.'
Maybe the implicit purpose was like the purpose implicit in St.
Ignatius Loyola's training missionary priests and sending them to Asia:
Maybe the implicit purpose in beginning law schools at American
Catholic universities was so that graduates could take up Christian
apostolates in places of power in America. Catholic law schools some-
times say that;" but we suspect that getting political and legal clout for
the Irish, the Italians, the Poles, and the Germans, had a lot to do with
why the law schools were set up, with the way they were operated, and
with the things the dean says in the annual report to the alumni. What
the American Catholic law schools were about, in other words, had
more to do with power than it had to do with service, which brings up
our second point.
B. The Presence of the Law School, As the Church, Is a Presence of
Service and Not of Power (Shaffer)
Our presence is in aid of the church's being in the world, which is
a presence of service and not of power. "[T]he community of faith...
gives itself to the service of all," Gustavo Gutierrez says.3 The Pastoral
2. When this paper was presented orally, it was divided between us, in the way that is
indicated in these topic headings. We preserve the division here because it allows us an unclut-
tered way to refer to first-person experiences and to direct the reader to other work each of us has
done on these themes. Both of us participated in writing the paper, and each of us is prepared to
answer for all of it.
3. Shaffer, The Mission of a Church-Related Law School: The Catholic Tradition, 22 VAL.
J.L. REV. 669 (1988); cf. R. O'BRIEN, LEGAL EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE (1985).
4. See, e.g., NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL, BULLETIN OF INFORMATION 1989-1990 at 4. The
bulletin states that "[tihe Notre Dame program aims to educate men and women to become
lawyers of extraordinary professional competence who possess a partisanship for justice, an ability
to respond to human need, and compassion for their clients and colleagues. Notre Dame lawyers
are actively involved in public service."
5. G. GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 8 (C. Inda & J. Eagleson trans. 1973).
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Constitution on the Church in the Modern World-a principal out-
come of the second Vatican Council-says, "The joys and the hopes,
the griefs and the anxieties of. .. this age . . . these are the joys and
hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ.""
You may notice that we are proceeding here in an ascending order
of awesomeness; first a Peruvian theologian, a liberation theologian,
then the Vatican council. We might as well complete the progression:
"The greatest among you must behave as if he were the youngest, the
leader as if he were the one who serves. For who is the greater: the one
at table or the one who serves? The one at table, surely? Yet here am I
among you as one who serves."' The service involved here is not a ser-
vice that seeks power; neither is it a service that serves power: It is a
service in powerlessness, a service of sacrifice and of reconciliation. It is
immediate, local, personal, and pastoral.
C. The Law School's Presence Is a Presence in the World (Shaffer)
The theology we are using here, according to Gutierrez,"implies
openness to the world, gathering the questions it poses." 8 Pastoral the-
ology does not dream up its issues in the academy; it goes out and finds
them. Vatican II said that the church depends on things outside itself
and it depends on these things in order to know what to do to serve
outside itself:
[T]he Church believes she can contribute greatly toward making the
family of man and its history more human. . . . [S]he is firmly con-
vinced that she can be abundantly and variously helped by this world in
the matter of preparing the ground for the gospel. This help she gains
from the talents and industry of individuals and from human society as a
whole."
Or, to put that in terms of clear dependence on the world, "[S]he...
ought to be enriched by the development of human social life .. so
that she may . ..adjust . . . more successfully to our times.""
We see a couple of directions coming from this modern Catholic
theology of presence in the world, directions that are useful in a theol-
ogy of legal education. One direction is to notice that we are present
where we are-in Western Ohio, in Northern Indiana and Southern
Michigan, in our middle-sized, mid-Western, heart-of-America, ethnic,
6. Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 1, in
RENEWING THE EARTH: CATHOLIC DOCUMENTS ON PEACE, JUSTICE AND LIBERATION 178 (D.
O'Brien & T. Shannon eds. 1977) [hereinafter Gaudium et Spes].
7. Luke 22:26-27.
8. G. GUTIERREZ, supra note 5, at 12.
9. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 6, at 1 40.
10. Id. at 44.
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rust-belt cities, and in the legal profession as it functions in these com-
munities. The Vatican document takes into account that inevitably lo-
cal way of being in the world, "the world" meaning what is around us.
As Karl Barth said, God finds us where He put us."1 The Vatican
Council also said that, but it added that this local presence is the pres-
ence of the church and it is how the church finds out what is going on.
The other direction suggested by this theology of being-in-the-
world is more threatening, threatening because it seems to be neglected
in American Catholic law schools. That is attention to our side of the
dialogue with the world, the church's side, when the church is a law
school. We don't find the "political hermeneutics of the Gospel" com-
ing out of teaching and scholarship in Catholic law schools; that is Gu-
tierrez's phrase."2 It means, in its use of the technical word "hermeneu-
tics," a point of view that governs interpretation-interpretation, in this
case, of what is going on in Northern Indiana and around here. We
think the political hermeneutics of the Gospel, if present among us and
,in our scholarship, would indicate that the church is present in what we
offer through our students and in print for the edification of the legal
profession. The church is not much present, in this sense, in this local,
physical sense, in Catholic law schools. We in our silence, to use a
phrase of Jurgen Moltmann's, "limp after reality."'"
There is a reason for this silence, and the reason relates to our past
as a ladder of vertical mobility for the children of immigrants. Our first
and best customers were the children of poor, alien people who came
into a Protestant, parochial America. They brought their cultures with
them, but their cultures were not admired-often not even by their own
children. Their cultures were not American. In that era, what was not
American was not desirable.'
There is a photographic history of the Italian-Americans that in-
cludes newspaper cartoons from the first 20 years of this century. There
are drawings there that show Italians as lawless, violent, small, dark,
and dishonest: It was un-American to be Italian-that was the mes-
sage.1 Or Polish. Or Irish. Or German.
The common reaction of the immigrants to that American hostility
was to prove themselves American, and nowhere with more vehemence
than on the campuses of Roman Catholic universities. Atop one of the
side doors to the main church at Notre Dame are the words, carved in
11. K. BARTH, ETHICS 193 (G. Bromiley trans. 1981).
12. G. GUTIERREZ, supra note 5, at 13.
13. J. MOLTMANN, THEOLOGY OF HOPE 36 (1967).
14. T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 173-228 (1987).
15. CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMAGES: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF ITALIAN AMERI-
CANS (1981).
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stone, "God, Country, and Notre Dame." When I was a student at
Notre Dame, a part of the commencement ceremony every spring was
a presentation to the president of the university, by the senior class, of
a huge American flag. Father Hesburgh blessed it, with all the gradu-
ates and parents looking on, and it was run up on the flag pole in front
of the Golden Dome. Every winter the senior class elected a prominent
citizen who came to campus and spent several days as our "patriot of
the year." In my last year, 1961, our patriot was Richard Nixon.
We seemed to be determined to prove we were as American as
anybody else. Princeton, Stanford, and the University of Wisconsin
seemed less moved to offer evidence of their love of country.
The theological lesson is that we seemed less concerned then than
we would be today that we were turning the American nation-state into
an idol." The sort of thing Catholic universities did in those days, to
prove they were patriotic American institutions, seems to me, today,
inconsistent with being the church, and, as the church, being in the
world. I tend to think of the Hebrew prophets when I think of models
for being the church, rather than of Nathan Hale and Betsy Ross.
"The prophet," Oscar Cullman said, "explains to the people the
true meaning of all events; he informs them of the plan and will of God
at the particular moment."' 7 Some of the prophets were put in prison
for being unpatriotic-and God seemed to say to them that their being
thrown into jail was what He had in mind for them. The plan and will
of God is not necessarily in the national interest; it may not be congru-
ent with the nine goals of the American Bar Association. We are, in
our presence in the world, and in the American nation-state, powerless
and even sacrificial. We are, to use a distinction I learned from John
Howard Yoder,' 8 subordinate but not subservient to the institutions of
society. Our subordination has a radical-even, according to Yoder, a
revolutionary-end in view. Our purposes as the church in the world
depend on a prophetic perspective that the God-and-Country tradition
in American Catholicism left out of account.
It follows from these thoughts about patriotism and the prophets
that the presence of the church, in the world, and in service outside of
itself, is a presence that is suspicious of established truths. Prophets are
usually wary of established truths; that is what makes them so trouble-
some, troublesome especially to the state and to those who govern the
business and ecclesiastical establishments. The church, as prophetic,
16. Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in America and the Religious Tradition, in LAW
AND THE ORDERING OF OUR LIFE TOGETHER 229-68 (R. Neuhaus ed. 1989).
17. 0. CULLMAN, THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 14 (S. Guthrie & C. Hall
trans. 1963).
18. J. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS 163-92 (1972).
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tells the truth about what is going on and about how much things cost.
If we need current examples of this,, we might usefully notice how
much this is true of the American bishops' pastoral letters on nuclear
weapons and on the economy. 9
D. The Presence of the Law School in the World Is Enacted Vicari-
ously (Shaffer)
A theology for the Catholic law school, from this point of view, is
a truthful contemplation of what lawyers do. "Theology does not pro-
duce pastoral activity,"2 ° Gutierrez says. "Rather it reflects upon it.
Theology must be able to find in pastoral activity the presence of the
Spirit inspiring the action of the Christian community."'" I read Gu-
tierrez to mean that the activity that goes on in our students' and grad-
uates' professional world, with which we are in conversation, is in a
vital way to be brought into our educational world and there subjected
to theological reflection.
That assumes, of course, a presence in the law school that is
clearly and thoughtfully the presence of the church; clearly and
thoughtfully prophetic. It assumes that the Catholic presence in Catho-
lic legal education is more than a matter of having mass in the law
building, or nearby. (One thinks of the prophets' raging against those
who followed the Torah in Temple worship and did not notice the
poor.22)
But our conversation with the world is conducted through those we
send into the world, to be lawyers there. It is in this vicarious way that
our principal conversation with the world occurs; our more direct con-
versations-in public service, in accommodating the Bar and the courts
in our scholarship and in small fraternal ways-is insignificant by com-
parison. Our presence is overwhelmingly vicarious.
Consider in this regard the long tradition we have in Catholic law
schools of giving words of comfort to our graduates. Not to our stu-
dents: God knows we give our students little enough comfort. But to
our graduates, whom we invite in from the world of law practice, so
that we can tell them they are doing all right. Their struggle for place
and prosperity in the hierarchical world of American legal institutions,
we say to them, is what we hoped they would be doing-and this espe-
cially if they land jobs or, better yet, eventual partnerships, in big law
19. UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LET-
TER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986); UNITED STATES CATHOLIC
CONFERENCE, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983).
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firms-especially big law firms in the East.
These words of comfort are certainly a kind of vicarious reflection
on our graduates' pastoral activity in the world; but I wonder about it.
I wonder about the presence of the Spirit in it. I don't aim to be moral-
istic here: I went to a large law firm and enjoyed the words of comfort
I got from Notre Dame about being there. In fact, I was hungry for
those words, as our graduates more often than not are. Life in a law
firm is not spiritually easy. I was the first Catholic my law firm hired,
and the firm acted not out of disinterested egalitarianism, but so that
its Catholic clients would not complain about the fact that the firm
excluded Catholics. The clients were introduced to a young lawyer
from Notre Dame. They didn't ask about the young lawyer's church;
they forgot, maybe, that Rockne was a Lutheran and Parseghian a
Presbyterian. They got their Catholic lawyer, in any case. I got words
of comfort from Notre Dame, and I was glad to get them.
There does not seem to be much radicalism, though, in the routine
practice of giving comfort to lawyers in big law firms-not much bibli-
cal radicalism. I doubt that Gustavo Gutierrez, whom I have been
quoting, whose pastoral activity is as a parish priest in the poorest part
of Lima, Peru, would give these words of comfort that we give our
graduates, and those who want to be our graduates, who are, in Au-
den's phrase, trudging on time to a tidy fortune.
Our vicarious presence in the world means that we are engaged in
forming those who are going into the world. That verb suggests the old-
fashioned Catholic noun, "formation." The church, as legal education,
is entrusted by God with the formation of people who will go out from
legal education to be the presence of the church in the world. This is
not a secondary or penultimate activity we are engaged in, though. It is
not behind the scenes. We are the church in the world as we do it.
(That means we will then have to ask in what sense we are in the world
when we are not in it, which is a good question. 3 )
We are here forming those who form: The church, according to
Vatican II, "is composed of. . .members of the earthly city who have
a call to form the family of God's children during the present history of
the human race, and to keep increasing it until the Lord returns."'"
Formation means the formation of moral character. It is a word we
used to hear in discussions of religious life-of monasteries and con-
vents. People who went to those places had to be formed for the profes-
sional lives they were to lead.
That part of the agenda for the church as law school is in some
23. Shaffer, supra note 16, at 229-68.
24. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 6, at 40.
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ways the clearest and easiest part of a theology for us. It is also, and in
other ways, the most difficult and maybe even the most painful, be-
cause, as Pogo said, the enemy is us.
God blesses us as He gives us this task of formation. His blessings
to us formers of lawyers are the virtues our students bring to us from
their families, their neighborhoods, and the religious congregations they
grew up in. Some of these communities are biological-organic. Some
are serious in their use of organic metaphors to describe themselves;
they are still in significant part ethnic communities.
The old church in the old Catholic law school reinforced the early
formation of its students without articulating-perhaps without articu-
lating even to itself-that that was what it was doing. At Notre Dame,
when I was a law student there, we were put in church for mass and
for retreats; our law classes were begun with a prayer; we lived under
paternal restrictions having to do with automobiles, alcohol, and the
opposite sex; we heard talks given by priests on why Catholic lawyers
could not act for plaintiffs in divorce cases; we got, thrice weekly, a
"religious bulletin," from a person who was described as the "prefect of
religion." It was full of chatty advice of the sort you might expect from
Bing Crosby in "Going My Way" and we were told about the natural
law as if it were in a code. These conventional ways of preserving home
and family virtues were naive, but they were often effective. They cer-
tainly provided something you could not find at Harvard or Indiana
University.
Catholic universities no longer observe these conventions. If the
conventions are observed on campus at all they are not observed in the
law school. The old way preserved home virtues without explication;
the modern way neither preserves nor explicates.
We have come, with secular legal education, to describe ourselves
as distrusting virtues learned at home. It has been the educational
boast of American legal education that it displaces these marks of ordi-
nary good character, that it produces in their place the analytical dis-
position we refer to as "thinking like a lawyer." ''"
The removal of marks of character has been the stated purpose of
"Socratic" teaching in first-year law courses, and particularly so since
the legal positivists took charge of our educational agenda. "Here's a
dime," Professor Kingsfield says. "Go call your mother and tell her you
will never be a lawyer." As another Harvard law teacher of legend put
it, "If you wanted to study justice, you should have gone to divinity
school."
Whatever complexity we may talk about in the task of forming
25. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE (1977).
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law students, the point of beginning may involve nothing more than
getting out of our own way-getting out of our students' way. Letting
the influence of their families shine through. We can begin to form
them by persuading them that their moral impulses are useful things
for a lawyer to have.2 6 This is not a sentimental point about mothers.
Nor is it as narrow and crude as a theory of moral development. It is a
point about formation and a recognition of the profound dependence we
have had, in Catholic schools, on the ethnic traditions that send us
their children in the hope for a better life.
E. The Presence of the Law School in the World Is a Searching
Presence that Reaches into the World to Find Out How to Form
Those Who Are to Go into the World to Be the Presence of the Church
(Rodes)
The Second Vatican Council teaches that the church is "at once a
sign and a safeguard of the transcendence of the human person.''27 I
think the old-model Catholic law school-the one that was just being
superseded when Tom came to Notre Dame to study and I came to
teach-fulfilled this role of the church for its students and their fami-
lies and the parishes and neighborhoods from which they came. But it
did not fulfill this role for the wider society. It was equipping its stu-
dents for what Gutierrez calls "a peaceful coexistence of privatized
faith within a secularized world. '28 Our students were not prepared in
their professional lives to signify and safeguard the transcendence of
the human person, because they did not understand where and how
their profession was challenging and belying that transcendence. They
did not understand because we did not teach them. We did not teach
them because we did not know. We did not know because we did not
ask the right questions of the world. In the Catholic Harvards, Yales,
and Stanfords, or whatever we are striving to become, I wonder
whether we are asking even now.
If we ask the world the right questions, the world will tell us the
truth about law and the legal profession, and we will be able to place
that truth in Christian context and share it with our students and the
readers of our scholarship. But the world does not encourage us to ask
the right questions. I was struck by a quotation from Helder Camara,
the Archbishop of Recife in Brazil, who said, "When I gave bread to
the poor they called me a saint. When I asked why the poor have no
26. Shaffer, Maximizing the Law School Experience, 12 STETSON L. REV. 551 (1983)
(preface to symposium of same name).
27. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 6, at T 76.
28. G. GUTIERREZ, supra note 5, at 224.
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bread they called me a Communist."29
We can be thankful that bread is more plentiful here than it is in
some places, but there are plenty of people who lack what they need for
a decent life, and what Catholic social teaching tells us they have a
right to. For some it is a roof over their heads, for some it is education
or medical care, for some it is the opportunity to be contributing and
participating members of society. The world does not like to be asked
why this is the case, and we may well not like to hear the answer.
Material and cultural poverty in American life is not like cancer
or heart disease; still less is it like the winds and the tides. It is a result
of our institutions, economic, social, and-I am sorry to say-legal."0
There would be enough money in our society to provide for everyone's
needs if we did not choose to spend it on other things. There would be
enough to do in our society to keep everyone productively occupied if
we did not choose to get it done in other ways. Poverty and unemploy-
ment are human artifacts as surely as highways and bridges-as surely
as deforestation and acid rain.
It follows-and this is what we would rather not hear-that the
same institutions that support our own prosperity are the ones that im-
poverish the poor among us. Whatever good there is in our laws and
institutions-and there is a great deal-has a price, and the poor in our
society are the ones who pay it. Back in the fifties, William Stringfel-
low, a Christian radical lawyer who lived and worked as a solo practi-
tioner in the seamiest part of Harlem, told an audience of Notre Dame
law students, "The people of Harlem are suffering vicariously for
you. ' 'a
What we will hear of, then, if we diligently question the world, is
our own complicity in the injustices we strive to eradicate. The institu-
tions by which other people are impoverished and degraded are the
very ones we have devoted ourselves to studying and serving, the very
ones from which we draw our material and psychic rewards. But there
is no easy way out of this complicity. We who study the institutional
complex know better than anyone else how cohesive and interdependent
it is. We see no way to make it work justly, and yet we see no way to
dismantle it without exposing rich and poor alike to anarchy and
starvation.
Our tendency as scholars and teachers is not to ask the hard ques-
tions. We are comfortable, and marginally useful, in fine-tuning the
29. 1 observed this quotation on a poster and frankly, I do not know where it came from.
30. R. RODES, LAW AND LIBERATION 1-21 (1986); Rodes, Greatness Thrust Upon
Them-Class Biases in American Law, 28 AMER. JOUR. OF JURIS. 1 (1983).
31. For the shortest, and, to my mind, the most moving statement of Stringfellow's doctrine,
see Stringfellow, Christianity, Poverty, and the Practice of Law, 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 451 (1979).
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distribution of benefits among the beneficiaries of our system, deploying
safety nets for the victims, and generally keeping the machinery run-
ning and doing as much good as it is able to do. We are apt to content
ourselves with that.
In doing so, we are apt to fall into what the Marxists call false
consciousness. There are always rationalizations in place for continuing
our privileges, for leaving intact the institutions that make us comforta-
ble and others poor. The rationalizations are generally built around the
genuine values that led us to set up the institutions in the first place.
They are easy to buy into and hard to see through. The only trouble
with them is that they leave out some aspect of the truth.
The rationalizations most commonly encountered in legal scholar-
ship and teaching these days are cost-benefit analysis and trickle down.
Cost-benefit analysis teaches that we must make no change in the sta-
tus quo until we are satisfied that the benefits of doing so will outweigh
the costs. For most proposed changes, the costs and benefits have al-
ready. been weighed, and the benefits have come up short. In reality,
though, costs and benefits are much less predictable than the analysts
suppose. Often, too, they are incommensurable. How much more are
you willing to pay for your shirt to keep a textile worker's lungs from
filling up with cotton dust?3" How much more will you pay for a head
of lettuce to provide migrant farm workers' families with toilets? Ques-
tions like these cannot and should not be answered. To live in the truth
is to expose ourselves to risk. We are called to meet known evils at an
unknown cost.
Trickle down has been condemned in many manifestations, but it
keeps taking on new ones. What it amounts to whenever it crops up is a
claim that we must be content with our privileges because the poor are
better off with the scraps from our table than they would be with a
main dish from their own. The prevalence of the claim is poignantly
illustrated in a column that appeared a few years ago in our student
newspaper. The author told of emerging with some of her friends at
eleven o'clock at night from a bar on Rush Street in Chicago. On the
street, they came on some little boys-so little they should have been in
bed long ago-out making money by shining shoes. Having spent a
good deal of money on her evening out, the author was moved and
disconcerted by the difference between these children's condition and
her own. In her heart, she was ready to give up some of her wealth to
redress the balance. But her mind told her differently: "Realistically,
we all learned in economics that the world does not work this way.
Wealth is the product of capitalism and capitalism is the result of indi-
32. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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vidual incentives and competition. Consequently, some have and some
have not." That economics class is a source of false consciousness. It
has taught this student to ignore what is before her eyes and trust the
academic constructs that support the status quo. If we inquire faith-
fully of the world, it will teach us the opposite.
The sovereign remedy against false consciousness is what the theo-
logians of liberation call the preferential option for the poor.33 The
term comes out of documents adopted by the Latin American hierar-
chy at Puebla in 1979; it has since been picked up by the American
bishops in their economics pastoral, and by the Vatican in its instruc-
tion on liberation theology. What this option entails, as I see it, is ex-
amining carefully the interests at stake in any political, economic, or
social decision we have to make, and then favoring the interest of the
poor over the interests competing with it. The reason we must do this is
not that the poor are more valuable in God's eyes than other people.
They just need more help. Also--and this is the more important point
for us as teachers and scholars-they are less visible. We are so far the
victims of false consciousness that we will not notice the poor unless we
go out of our way to do so. If we set out to deal evenhandedly between
rich and poor, we will inevitably end up favoring the rich. If we set out
to do no more for the poor than justice requires, we will end up doing
less. This is as true of our teaching and scholarship as it is of other
lawyers' corporate practice.
What we must steadily ask of the world, then, if we are to be
truthful teachers and scholars, is what effect legal transactions have on
the people underneath them. How does our real estate law affect people
who need places to live? How does our law on corporate mergers affect
working people and their families? How does our criminal justice sys-
tem affect the ability of the urban poor to walk out on their streets?
How does the first amendment affect their ability to teach their chil-
dren to live decent lives?
The preferential option for the poor, understood in this way, is not
an ideology. It does not simply call us to replace our old institutions
with new ones. It calls us to examine carefully all institutions, new and
old, and take such control of them as is required to see that they serve
the whole society. Despite what they say about Helder Camara, his
doctrine is not a form of communism. Communism is not a perception
of the problem; it is a proffered solution, and one at least as subject to
false consciousness as any other.
Also, the option for the poor is not a career choice. We are very
33. R. RODES, supra note 30, at 214; Rodes, Law, History, and the Option for the Poor. 6
LOGos 61 (1985).
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right to give our graduates who go in for legal services or public inter-
est law at least as much positive reinforcement as we give the ones who
make partner on Wall Street, but to be content with that would be
more false consciousness. The burdens of poverty are fashioned in the
Wall Street offices faster and more effectively than the legal services
and public interest offices can lift them. If you spend the day on corpo-
rate takeovers and plant closings without thinking about the people you
put out of work, you cannot make up for the harm you do by giving a
woman free legal advice in the evening when her unemployed husband
takes out his frustrations by beating her.
The option for the poor is fundamentally a Christian ascetic prac-
tice. It can be undertaken wherever we are and whatever we do. It calls
for thinking habitually how a proposed course of action will affect the
poor, the powerless, the invisible among the people involved in it. If you
work on a corporate merger, it involves asking what will become of the
employees and their families. If you work on an urban renewal project,
it involves asking where the people you are displacing are to live, and
whether they will like it there. If you work on a debt collection, it in-
volves asking whether the debtor has been overreached.
III. CONCLUSION
What we are more likely to hear than anything else, at the end of
a talk such as this, is that nothing we can think of to do will work. No
one is going to argue-we guess-that law faculties at our two schools
should not seek to form our students to be the church in the world; or
that they should not listen to the world to learn what the gospel re-
quires of them; or that our masters in Columbus or Indianapolis or
Washington should not consider the preferential option for the poor in
making legal and political decisions. What we are far more likely to
hear is that ideas dreamed up by two professors at an academic sympo-
sium are not useful because they will not work.
The good news the church brings, and the law school as the church
-should bring, is the good news that we need not be afraid to be right.
Gutierrez says, "Faith proclaims that the brotherhood which is
sought through the abolition of the exploitation of man by man is
something possible, that efforts to bring it about are not in vain, that
God calls us to it and assures us of its complete fulfillment."'" He says
that "the definitive reality is being built on what is transitory. '3 5 Our
feeble efforts are worth making. We need not be afraid to be right, not
even in an academic symposium.




"Faith reveals to us the deep meaning of the history which we
fashion with our own hands," he says.30 Faith "teaches us that every
human act which is oriented toward the construction of a more just
society has value in terms of communion with God."37
36. Id.
37. Id.
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